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Abstract
In this paper we develop a structural model for job search behavior of stu-
dents entering the labor market. The model includes endogenous search
e®ort and on the job search. Since students usually do not start a regular
job before graduation but start job search earlier, our model is non station-
ary. The model explains the common ¯nding that a substantial share of
individuals starts working immediately upon graduation. We estimate the
model using a unique data set of individuals who completed undergradu-
ate education in the Netherlands between 1995 and 2001. Our estimation
results show that a 1 percentage point decrease in unemployment rate in-
creases wage o®ers on average with 3 percent and that there are substantial
returns to work experience. Employment rates at graduation could be in-
creased from 40 percent to 65 percent if all students start job search 6
months prior to graduation.
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Students anticipate the moment of graduation by searching for work already some
period before graduating (e.g. Wolpin, 1987). Therefore, a substantial share of
students starts working immediately after completing education (e.g. Bowlus,
Kiefer and Neumann, 2001, Ferrall, 1997, and Wolpin, 1987). Young workers usu-
ally do not stay very long in their ¯rst job. Topel and Ward (1992) argue that
young workers are searching for good matches, i.e. high paying jobs. Job-to-job
transitions are often associated to wage increases and the behavior of young work-
ers is largely consistent with job search theory.1 The high job turnover and fast
wage growth in the beginning of a career can be the result of the existence of
frictions within a stationary labor market environment. An alternative explana-
tion is that the returns to work experience are relatively high for new entrants in
the labor market. This implies that the labor market conditions faced by young
workers change after they start working in their ¯rst job.
In this paper we develop a model describing the labor market behavior of in-
dividuals around the moment of completing undergraduate education. Our model
is a discrete-time job search model (see e.g. Mortensen, 1986, for an extensive dis-
cussion on models describing job search behavior). Unlike most empirical studies
of labor market behavior, which take job search e®ort exogenously, we explicitly
model the amount of job search e®ort (see Bloemen, 2004; Fougµ ere, Pradel and
Roger, 2002; Stern, 1989; and Yoon, 1981; for structural empirical analyses of job
search models with endogenous search e®ort). Additionally, we model the opti-
mal moment at which individuals start searching for work, which often precedes
the date of graduation. The optimal timing of starting job search depends on
the returns to job search and the costs of searching. We assume that the costs
function of job search e®ort has two components, ¯xed costs made at the mo-
ment of starting job search, and °exible costs in each period depending on the
amount of job search e®ort. Because students usually do not start working in
regular jobs before actually graduating, the decision problem of students is non
stationary (even if all structural elements of the model would be constant over
time). We show that after the (optimal) moment of starting job search, students
increase their job search e®ort and lower their reservation wage each period until
the moment of graduating or accepting a job.
Our model explains the substantial share of individuals who start working im-
mediately after graduation di®erently from the recent economic literature. Since
we have information on the actual moment an individual starts searching for
1Christensen, Lentz, Mortensen, Neumann and Werwatz (2005) argue that the e®ect of
tenure on wages in small in the wage growth of individuals.
1work, we can identify the job search process prior to graduation. Most closely re-
lated is Wolpin (1987), who imposes that all individuals start searching the same
¯xed period before graduation and that each period all individuals devote the
same amount of e®ort to job search. Other structural empirical analyses do not
explicitly model the job search process before graduation. Ferrall (1997) assumes
that at the moment of leaving school all individuals have received exactly two
job o®ers, and are employed if the wage associated to the best job o®er exceeds
the individual's reservation wage. Bowlus, Kiefer and Neumann (2001) ignore job
search spells where an individual starts working immediately upon leaving school.
Gras and Lindeboom (1994) adopt a similar strategy, but correct for potential
selection among those who failed to ¯nd a job before graduation.
Because young workers are mobile and wages tend to increase fast, the wage
in the ¯rst job is not a proper indicator for the present value of life-time earnings
(e.g. Eckstein and Wolpin, 1995). Therefore, we do not only model the job search
process until accepting the ¯rst job, but we also allow for on-the-job search. We
do not restrict the structural parameters describing the job search environment
to be similar for individuals looking for their ¯rst job and for employed workers.
This allows us to distinguish between the hypothesis that high job mobility and
increasing wages are the result of frictions on the labor market as opposed to the
hypothesis that it is the result of accumulating work experience.
A structural model has several advantages when analyzing the labor market
behavior of students. Labor marker transitions and wages are jointly determined,
and thus the interdependency between these variables can be studied. The model
shows how to handle individuals that have not been unemployed between leaving
school and starting work. Since we allow for on-the-job search, our model provides
estimates of the returns to early work experience. Finally, by explicitly modelling
job search behavior, we obtain an estimate for the costs of job search.
In the empirical analyses we use data from an annual survey of young work-
ers who recently ¯nished undergraduate education at Dutch universities. In the
Netherlands, it is unusual that after completing undergraduate education, stu-
dents continue with Ph.D. education. Our data describes cohorts of individuals
who graduated in economics, business administration, Dutch law or psychology
between 1995 and 2001. Since labor market conditions for these individuals di®er,
we estimate our model separately for di®erent studies. Our data are unique in a
sense that they are extensive on job search behavior, for example the data include
the moment at which individuals actually start looking for work and the number
of job applications. Furthermore, the data are rich on individual characteristics.
It is not our intention to estimate returns to education or to compare returns of
the di®erent studies. The latter would require an extended model, which includes
2the selection process into these studies.
The Dutch economy experienced a period of relatively fast economic growth
at the end of the 1990s. This was characterized by improvements in labor mar-
ket conditions, i.e. labor force participation rates, worker mobility, number of
vacancies, and real wages increased. After 2000 the growth of the Dutch economy
slowed down and the economy entered a period of recession. We investigate to
what extent labor market prospects of students depend on macroeconomic condi-
tions. We allow the structural parameters to depend on business cycle indicators.
The e®ect of business cycle variation on individual search e®ort is ambiguous,
the direction depends on the values of the parameters (see also Shimer, 2004).
We use the estimation results to compute how labor market prospects vary
over the business cycle and to investigate the importance of the returns to early
work experience. We show that if there would not be any returns to work expe-
rience, individuals change behavior, for example, by setting a higher reservation
wage for their ¯rst job. Our structural model disentangles the e®ect of labor mar-
ket frictions from the e®ect of early work experience. Because it takes account
of changes in individual behavior, the structural model provides ideal counter-
factuals. We show that the returns to early work experience are important. Both
employment rates and average earnings of young workers would be substantially
lower in a world without returns to work experience.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides institutional back-
ground on the Dutch educational system and business cycle variation during the
observation period. In Section 3 we present the structural model. The data are
discussed in Section 4. In Section 5 we show reduced-form analyses to investi-
gate the validity of the structural model. In Section 6 we provide details on the
estimation of our structural model. Section 7 presents the estimation results of
the structural model and analyses the returns to early work experience. Section
8 concludes.
2 Educational system in the Netherlands
In this section we brie°y discuss the university education system in the Nether-
lands. We restrict attention to elements that are relevant for undergraduate stu-
dents in economics, business administration, Dutch law or psychology.
All universities in the Netherlands are public and tuition fees are low. The
tuition fee is set by the government and does not vary by ¯eld of study or by
university attended. Annual tuition fees for full-time students (under age 30)
increased from around 800 euros in the early 1990s to around 1250 euros at the
3end of the 1990s. Undergraduate students are entitled to a ¯nancial aid system.
The grant depends on parental income and whether or not students live at their
parents' house (see Leuven, Oosterbeek and Van der Klaauw, 2003, for a more
extensive discussion). During the 1990s a number of changes occurred. First, a
larger share of the grant was made dependent on parental income. In nominal
terms the grant for students with low-earning parents remained between 300 euros
and 350 euros monthly (dependent on living at the parents' house) during the
1990s, for students with high-earning parents nominal grants decreased more than
50 percent during the 1990s. Second, students with low-earning parents got access
to a loan with a maximum of 150 euros in the early 1990s and over 400 euros at
the end of the 1990s. Students typically use the grants, but are very reluctant to
take up the loan. Third, the duration of entitlement to grants decreased. Students
who started university education before 1990 received grants for a maximum of
6 years, from 1991 until 1995 the entitlement period was 5 years and in 1996 it
was reduced to a maximum of 4 years. Also grants can become loans if students
did not pass a minimum number of courses.
Undergraduate education is accessible to students who graduated from pre-
university track in secondary education and for students from higher vocational
education. Universities are not permitted to select students, every student sat-
isfying the entry requirements should be admitted. Traditionally most students
entered university after the pre-university track in secondary education. However,
during the 1990s entry through higher vocational education became more popu-
lar. This is particularly true for economics and business administration where in
2002 around 45 percent of the students entered through higher vocational educa-
tion compared to only 25 percent in 1992. For Dutch law and psychology these
percentages are much lower.
Currently only 6 Dutch universities o®er undergraduate programs in eco-
nomics and business administration, 9 o®er an undergraduate in law and 10
o®er an undergraduate in psychology. At all universities the nominal duration
of an undergraduate program is 4 years (although most students do not actu-
ally graduate within this period). In the Netherlands a study is a specialization,
students take almost 90 percent of their courses within their chosen study. Un-
dergraduate education is often the ¯nal stage of an individual's education. In the
Netherlands annually only around 200 Ph.D. students graduate in economics,
business administration, law and psychology together, which is about 2.5 percent
of the total number of individuals completing undergraduate education. Even
though undergraduate programs di®er between universities, they are considered
to be close substitutes. Oosterbeek, Groot and Hartog (1992) compare the labor
market outcomes of students from the di®erent economics departments in the

































Netherlands and ¯nd that selection corrected wage di®erentials are modest.
Figure 1 presents total enrollment at Dutch universities during the period
1992 until 2002. From 1992 until 1998 the total number of students decreased
from around 187,500 to just above 160,000. After 1998 the number of students
increased again to the level at the beginning of the 1990s. In Figure 2 we present
¯rst-year enrollment and the number of students ¯nishing undergraduate educa-
tion. The number of graduates shows a peak in 1995/1996, due to the fact that
the 1990/1991 cohort of students received grants for 6 years and the 1991/1992
cohort for 5 years. The pattern in ¯rst-year enrollment follows that of total enroll-
ment closely. At the beginning of the 1990s the size of the relevant birth cohort
decreased. In 1992 around 14 percent of the individuals between 18 and 23 years
old were enrolled in a university. In 1997 this was 15 percent and it increased
further to 17 percent in 2002. The latter can be explained from the increased
popularity among graduates from higher vocational education to continue with
university education.
Trends in graduation, ¯rst-year and total enrollment in economics, business
administration, Dutch law and psychology follow the general trends closely. The
only exception is that for economics the increase in (¯rst-year) enrollment at the
end of the 1990s is somewhat larger than the general trend. Again this is caused
by the fact that economics is particularly popular among graduates from higher
vocational school.
During the end of the 1990s the Dutch economy experienced a period of
5Figure 2: The number of students (£ 1000) enrolling in the ¯rst year and gradu-

















































































































relatively large economic growth. Figure 3 provides GDP growth during our ob-
servation period and Figure 4 shows the unemployment rate. The year 2000 can
be considered as the top of the business cycle. From 1994 until 2000 the growth
rate of GDP was increasing and the unemployment rate was decreasing. After
2000 growth in GDP started to decline and at the end of 2001 the unemployment
rate started to increase.
3 The model
In this section we present the model that we use to describe the transition from
college to work. The model is a discrete-time job search model with endogenous
search e®ort and on-the-job search. Burdett (1978) ¯rst derived a job search
model that allowed for on-the-job search and Mortensen (1977) explicitly mod-
elled search e®ort as an individual decision variable. The model imposes that
individuals choose their level of job search e®ort and reservation wage path to
optimize their present value of future earnings. Individuals can start searching for
work before they graduate, but they (usually) do not start working in a regular
job before the actual date of graduation. We assume the moment of graduation
to be exogenous and known to the individuals. Usually, students ¯nish their un-
dergraduate study with writing a short thesis (and maybe completing some ¯nal
courses). Students can graduate each month, but most students graduate in Au-
gust (slightly over 40 percent in our sample). In the Dutch educational system,
students have no incentive to postpone the moment of graduation. High skilled
7jobs, at for example international companies, law ¯rms or the government, often
require a completed undergraduate education. Furthermore, after graduation in-
dividuals are entitled to welfare bene¯ts, which are higher than student grants
that only have a limited entitlement period, and while being a students individu-
als have to pay tuition fees. However, we will allow ¯rms to have some uncertainty
about the exact moment of graduation of a student applying for work.
3.1 The search process before graduation
Consider a student ¿ periods before graduation. The student can be in two pos-
sible states, actively searching for work or not searching for work. A student who
is searching for work has to decide at the beginning of each period ¿ how much
e®ort s¿ ¸ 0 to devote to job search. There are two types of costs associated to
job search e®ort. First, ¯xed costs C0 made only once at the moment the student
starts searching for work actively.2 These ¯xed costs include for example writing a
vitae and a draft of an application letter, registering at public employment o±ces
and private matching agencies, etc. Second, there are some variable costs, denoted
by cu(s¿), depending on the amount of job search e®ort, which involve checking
newspapers for job advertisements, sending out applications, etc. A student who
is not searching does not have these variable costs, i.e. cu(0) = 0. The costs of de-
voting job search e®ort are increasing in the amount of e®ort, c0
u(s¿) > 0, and we
assume c00
u(s¿) > 0 (Mortensen, 1986; and Stern, 1989; make similar assumptions
to guarantee the existence of a reservation wage).
A student who devotes ¿ periods before graduation e®ort s¿ to job search,
receives a job o®er in this period with probability 0 · ¸u(s¿) · 1. Students who
do not devote any e®ort to job search cannot receive job o®ers, i.e. ¸u(0) = 0.
Increasing the amount of job search e®ort increases the probability of receiving a
job o®er, ¸0
u(s¿) > 0, but the returns to job search e®ort diminish ¸00
u(s¿) < 0. A
job o®er is characterized by its wage w, which is a realization from the (contin-
uous) wage o®er distribution function Fu;¿(w) (with ¯nite mean, EFu;¿[w] < 1).
The wage o®er distribution can shift in the period before graduation. This ex-
presses that ¯rms can have some uncertainty about the moment a student will
graduate and the skills of the student before all courses are completed. Firms
discount this uncertainty in their wage o®ers, i.e. ¯rms make lower wage o®ers
to a student longer before graduation. For every ¿, the wage o®er distribution
Fu;¿(¢) ¯rst-order stochastically dominates Fu;¿+1(¢), i.e. Fu;¿(w) · Fu;¿+1(w) for
all w > 0. At the moment a job is o®ered, the student has to decide immedi-
ately to accept the job or to reject it and continue searching. We exclude the
2Yoon (1981) assumes that a job searcher make some ¯xed costs in every period.
8possibility to reconsider job o®ers at a later stage. Once the student decides to
accept a job o®er, he starts working in the new job immediately after graduating.
We do not consider the possibility that a student already starts working before
graduation. Neither do we allow for the possibility of continuing searching for a
better job after a job has been accepted. This assumption simpli¯es the analysis.
Alternatively, we could allow individuals to continue searching after accepting
a job. This holds observationally equivalent results, but is in our opinion (only
based on anecdotal evidence) a less realistic assumption. An alternative motiva-
tion for making this assumption is that a student, who already accepted a job
and continues searching for work, might be less credible for other employers.
Individuals have an in¯nite horizon and they know the values of ¸u(¢), C0,
cu(¢), and the distribution functions Fu;¿(¢). However, they do not know in ad-
vance when job o®ers arrive and what the associated wages are. We assume that
students maximize their expected present value of future income. Future income
is discounted at the subjective rate ½ > 0. For a student who is actually search-
ing for work ¿ periods before graduation, we de¯ne Ru;¿ as the present value of























where the wage W is a random variable that follows the distribution Fu;¿(¢) and
Re(w) is the value of working (after graduation) in a job with wage w. We derive
Re(w) in the next subsection. For convenience we assume that the costs of job
search e®ort cu(s¿) are made at the end of each period. From the Bellman's
equation it can be seen that if the student receives a job o®er with associated
wage w in period ¿, he accepts this job o®er if the present value of accepting
the job Re(w)=(1 + ½)¿¡1 exceeds the value of search Ru;¿¡1. As will be shown
later Re(w) is an increasing function in w. Therefore, ¿ periods before graduation
there exists a reservation wage Á¿, which is found by solving
Re(Á¿)
(1 + ½)¿¡1 = Ru;¿¡1
Substituting this reservation wage property into the Bellman's equation gives the





¿¡1 + ¸u(s¿)EFu;¿ [maxfRe(W) ¡ Re(Á¿);0g]
+Re(Á¿)g
(2)
Proposition 1 Á¿ ¸ Á¿¡k for all ¿ = 1;::: and k = 1;:::;¿. Before gradua-
tion the reservation wage of a student Á¿ is non increasing as the moment of
graduation approaches.
Proof in Appendix A.
Given the reservation wage Á¿, the optimal search e®ort ¿ periods before grad-
uation maximizes Á¿+1. The ¯rst-order condition for the optimal amount of job










[Re(x) ¡ Re(Á¿)]dFu;¿(x) (3)
The left-hand side is positive and increasing in s¿ (recall that c00
u(s¿) > 0 and
¸00
u(s¿) < 0). A necessary condition for a student to devote a positive amount of











The right-hand side is positive and decreasing in Á¿, while the left-hand side is
constant and positive. Let ¹ Á¿ be the maximum value for which the inequality still
holds, which is decreasing in ¿. Recall from Proposition 1 that the reservation
wage is non decreasing in ¿. If in some period ¿ the reservation wage exceeds ¹ Á¿
the student does not devote any e®ort to job search in this period, nor has the
student devoted any e®ort to job search in the preceding periods.
Proposition 2 If s¿ > 0, then s¿ < s¿¡k for all ¿ = 1;::: and k = 1;:::;¿.
Students, who have not accepted a job yet, increase their job search e®ort as the
moment of graduation gets closer.
Proof in Appendix A.
10So far we focused on students who were already actively searching for work.
As mentioned above individuals have to make ¯xed costs C0 to start searching
for work. Consider a student who is not searching for work ¿ periods before







This implies that a students decides to start searching for work in this period if






If we substitute Ru;¿ = Re(Á¿+1)=(1 + ½)¿, this condition becomes




Re(Át+1) ¡ C0(1 + ½)
tª
Using this inequality we can ¯nd the optimal moment ¿0 for a student to start
searching for work actively. This moment ¿0 satis¯es
¿0 = arg max
¿=1;:::
©
Re(Á¿) ¡ C0(1 + ½)
¿¡1ª
(4)
The function C0(1+½)¿¡1 is the present value at the moment of graduation of the
¯xed search costs. It is increasing in ¿, meaning that the earlier a student starts
searching for work, the higher the present value of the ¯xed search costs. Also
Re(Á¿) is an increasing function in ¿, implying that also the payo®s of starting
with job search earlier are higher.
Proposition 3 ¿0 is non decreasing if C0 decreases, i.e. lower ¯xed costs of start-
ing job search do not cause a student to start searching for work actively shorter
before the moment of graduation.
Proof in Appendix A.
A student does not start searching at all before graduation if the payo®s of job
search do not exceed the present value of the ¯xed costs, i.e. in each period
¿ = 1;:::, Re(Á¿) < C0(1+½)¿¡1. Given that a student starts searching for work
before graduation, the moment at which the student starts is uniquely determined
by equation (4). The function Re(Á¿) ¡ C0(1 + ½)¿¡1 has a single optimum.
Proposition 4 The moment ¿0 at which a student starts searching for work is
unique or non-existing.
11Proof in Appendix A.
To summarize the behavior of students, prior to period ¿0 the student does not
devote any e®ort to job search and does not obtain any job o®ers. After that the
student starts searching with a relatively low job search e®ort and increases job
search e®ort each period (until graduation or accepting work). Since the student
does not obtain job o®ers before ¿0, the reservation wage is not speci¯ed prior to
¿0. At ¿0 the reservation wage is relatively high. Towards the moment of gradua-
tion the reservation wage is at least non increasing, but typically decreasing.
For a student who has not accepted a job until the beginning of period ¿, the
probability of accepting a job in period ¿ equals
µ¿ =
½
¸u(s¿)(1 ¡ Fu;¿(Á¿)) if ¿ · ¿0
0 if ¿ > ¿0
Before ¿0 students do not receive job o®ers and thus the probability of accepting
work equals 0. After ¿0, the probability of accepting a job increases as the moment
of graduation approaches.
Proposition 5 µ¿ < µ¿¡k for all ¿ = 1;:::;¿0 and k = 1;:::;¿.
Proof in Appendix A.
3.2 The search process after graduation
Upon graduation an individual can either become unemployed or can start work-
ing. An individual starts working if he already accepted a job while being student.
Individuals can search for a new job when being employed and make a job-to-job
transition. We do not allow the possibility that employed workers get ¯red from
a job or that they quit working.3 Individuals who become unemployed at gradu-
ation, either actively searched for work while being student but did not succeed
in ¯nding work or did not start searching for work yet.
Consider an individual who did not start working yet. This individual is enti-
tled to collecting a particular type of welfare bene¯ts, denoted by b. Welfare ben-
e¯ts for school leavers are reduced bene¯ts compared to those collected by other
welfare recipients, like job losers. The level of bene¯ts depends on the housing
3In our data set we hardly observe transitions from being employed to unemployment. Of
the individuals who were observed to have had at least 1 job, 99 percent are employed at the
end of our observation period.
12situation. For most school leavers the level of the monthly gross welfare bene¯ts
is about 435 euros. School leavers often qualify for housing subsidies, therefore
we set the net monthly bene¯ts level b equal to 450 euros. These welfare bene¯ts
are paid for an unlimited period of time. After graduation the structural parame-
ters, cu(s), ¸u(s), and ½ remain the same as before graduation and the wage o®er
distribution is given by Fu(w). Since the model is stationary (after graduation)
unemployed workers choose each period the same amount of job search e®ort s
and the same reservation wage Á. Let Ru be the value of search of an unemployed














From this equation it can be seen that welfare bene¯ts b are paid at the end of
each period. The Bellman's equation can be rewritten as
½Ru = b + max
s¸0
f¡cu(s) + ¸u(s)EFu [maxfRe(W) ¡ Ru;0g]g
If an unemployed worker receives a job o®er with wage w, he accepts the o®er if
Re(w) ¸ Ru. The reservation wage Á of the unemployed worker can be found by
solving
Re(Á) = Ru









(Re(w) ¡ Re(Á))dFu(w) (5)
The left-hand side of the ¯rst-order condition is positive, and it is increasing in
s. Therefore, a necessary condition for individuals to devote a positive amount of









As the right-hand side is positive and decreasing in Á, there exists some reserva-
tion wage ¹ Á for which an unemployed worker does not devote any e®ort to job
search.
The framework we discussed so far is stationary, which means that as long as
an individual is unemployed, the individual has the same reservation wage and
13devotes in every period the same amount of e®ort to job search. It also implies that
an individual who does not start searching for work immediately after graduating
will never devote any e®ort to job search and will never start working. This
latter contradicts our data as around 20 percent of the individuals have not yet
performed any job search activities 1 month after graduation. Almost 10 percent
of the individuals have not even started searching for work within 3 months after
graduation. These individuals derive for some period an instantaneous utility
from not working which is much higher than the welfare bene¯ts level, for example
because they planned a long holiday after graduation instead of going to the labor
market directly. For individuals who started only some months after graduation,
we assume that for a ¯xed period with length t0 immediately after graduation
their instantaneous utility of being unemployed equals ¹ b. The high value of ¹ b
causes that Á > ¹ Á. The individual does not devote any e®ort to job search for
t0 ¡1 periods after graduation. For the same reason this individual also does not
search for work before graduation. In theory ¹ b could be in¯nite, implying that
the individual de¯nitely wants to be unemployed for t0 periods after graduation.
We assume that t0 and ¹ b are known to the individual already before graduation.
Like students, who start searching for work, these individuals have to make ¯xed
search costs C0 at the moment they ¯rst start searching for work (t0 ¡ 1 periods
after graduation).
Next, consider an employed individual receiving in each period wage w. While
being employed, workers can search for other jobs, but they cannot lose their job.
The search process of employed workers is similar to that of students and unem-
ployed workers, but they face di®erent structural parameters. The probability of
receiving a job o®er equals ¸e(s) and wage o®ers are drawn from the wage o®er
distribution Fe(w), which have the same properties as ¸u(s) and Fu(w) respec-
tively. For employed workers there are only the variable costs ce(s) of devoting
e®ort to job search, also ce(s) has the same properties as cu(s). As mentioned
















The Bellman's equation implies that wages are received at the end of a period.
The equation can be rewritten as
½Re(w) = w + max
s¸0
f¡ce(s) + ¸e(s)EFe [maxfRe(W) ¡ Re(w);0g]g (7)
14From the Bellman's equation follows that Re(x) > Re(y) if x > y, the value of
work increases with the wage received by a worker. Therefore, employed workers
accept a job o®er if the associated wage exceeds their current wage w. The optimal








(Re(x) ¡ Re(w))dFe(x) (8)
Since the right-hand side is a decreasing function in w and the left-hand side is
an increasing function in s, the optimal amount of job search e®ort s is lower if
individuals receive higher wages w. Individuals only devote a positive amount of









Since the left-hand side is positive and the right-hand side is decreasing in w,
there is some wage ¹ w above which employed workers do not search for work
anymore.
Proposition 6 There exists a wage level ¹ w, for which s = 0 if w ¸ ¹ w. For
w < ¹ w, s is positive and decreasing in w. A worker reduces his job search e®ort
if he receives a higher wage. If the wage exceeds a certain level, the worker does
not devote any e®ort to job search (see also Mortensen, 1986).4
Proof in Appendix A.
This proposition implies that above the wage level ¹ w, the value of working Re(w)
equals w=½. An individual who reaches a wage level above ¹ w, quits searching for
work and stays in this job forever.
3.3 Some remarks on the identi¯cation and parameteri-
zation
The unknown structural parameters of the model are the wage o®er distributions
Fu;¿(w), Fu(w) and Fe(w), the job o®er arrival probabilities ¸u(s) and ¸e(s), the
variable costs function of job search cu(s) and ce(s), the initial costs of starting
job search C0, and the discount rate ½. Before providing the parameterization of
these structural parameters we discuss their identi¯cation.
4Mortensen (1986) has a continuous-time framework and parameterizes the job o®er arrival
rate as ¸s.
15Let us for a moment assume that we observe the reservation wage path from
the moment an individual starts searching for work. In case we observe the exact
moment ¿ at which the individual accepts a wage o®er we can identify the wage
o®er distribution above the reservation wage Fu;¿(wjw > Á¿). It is well known
from Flinn and Heckman (1982) that the tail of the wage o®er distribution below
the reservation wage cannot be identi¯ed without information on wages associated
to rejected job o®ers. Therefore, we cannot identify the wage o®er distribution
below the lowest possible reservation wage, which is the reservation wage after
graduation. A similar identi¯cation problem arises for the wage o®er distribution
of employed workers searching for a new job. An employed worker accepts a new
job if the wage o®er w exceeds his current wage wc, so we can identify Fe(wjw >
wc). Again we cannot identify the wage o®er distribution below the lowest possible
wage at which an individual is working, which is the earlier mentioned lowest
possible reservation wage. So we identify Fe(w) on the same support as Fu(w).
As will be mentioned below, to establish identi¯cation we assume that the shape
of the wage o®er distribution is known up to a set of unknown parameters.
Before starting the ¯rst job, the probability of accepting a job equals ¸u(s¿)(1¡
Fu;¿(Á¿)). This hazard can be identi¯ed from the time individuals have been
searching for their ¯rst job. Without observing s¿, we can only identify the job
o®er arrival rate up to a normalization, as a high job o®er arrival rate associated
with a wage o®er distribution that has some mass below the reservation wage
cannot be distinguished from a low job o®er arrival rate and a wage o®er distri-
bution without any mass under the reservation wage. The identi¯cation hinges
on the assumption made above that the shape of the wage o®er distribution is
known up to a ¯nite set of parameters.
The costs function of job search e®ort is identi¯ed from observing job search
e®ort, wages, and reservation wages. Recall that the function for the optimal
amount of job search e®ort is given by equation (3) before graduation and equa-
tion (5) after graduation. These equations show that from observing job search
e®ort s we can identify the derivatives of the costs function of job search e®ort
c0
u(s) and c0
e(s). Since cu(0) = ce(0) = 0, we can actually identify for a given s
the costs function cu(s) as
R s
0 c0




The discount rate ½ is identi¯ed from the reservation wage path. In the dif-
ferential equation (2) describing the optimal reservation wage path all elements
except for ½ are identi¯ed or observed. So solving the optimal reservation wage
path identi¯es the discount rate ½. However, estimation of ½ turned out to be
problematic even using simulated data. Therefore, we decided not to consider
½ as a parameter to be estimated, but instead to ¯x its value to 0.20 annually,
which gave a better ¯t than other values we tried.
16The initial costs of job search C0 are identi¯ed from the moment a student
starts searching for work. Given that we do know all other structural parameters,
the value of C0 is given by equation (4), which ensures that C0 is identi¯ed.
So far, we have supposed that the complete reservation wage path of the un-
employed worker is observed. However, the data do not provide reservation wages.
Flinn and Heckman (1982) stress that if reservation wages are unobserved, similar
identi¯cation results can be derived. The identi¯cation hinges on the fact that
the minimum of the accepted wages equals the reservation wage at graduation.
We allow the structural parameters to be dependent on individual characteris-
tics. Let x denote the vector of individual characteristics (including an intercept).
The wage o®er distribution can change over time in the period before gradua-
tion. To impose some more structure we distinguish the period until three months
before graduation and the period from three months before graduation until grad-
uation. Within these periods the wage o®er distribution remains the same and
follows a lognormal distribution function. Until three months before graduation,
the location parameter is given by ®¹, afterwards it equals ¹. The scale para-
meter of the wage o®er distribution is ¾2. The parameter ® re°ects the earlier
mentioned uncertainty of employers about the graduation date of students. After
graduation the wage o®er distribution is the same as in the three months before
graduation, so lognormal with location parameter ¹ and scale parameter ¾2. For
employed workers the wage o®er distribution follows a lognormal distribution
function with location parameter Ã¹¹ and scale parameters ¾2. The parameter
Ã¹ can be interpreted as the returns to early work experience. Furthermore, we
let ¹ depend on individual characteristics by ¹ = x¯w.
The job o®er arrival probability of unemployed workers and students follows
an exponential distribution with intensity ¸
¸u(s) = 1 ¡ exp(¡¸s) s ¸ 0
This functional form ensures that the job o®er probability equals 0 if an individual
does not devote any e®ort to job search (s = 0) and increases in s. For employed
workers we take the job o®er probability equal to
¸e(s) = 1 ¡ exp(¡Ã¸¸s) s ¸ 0
The parameter Ã¸ can be considered as a measure for labor market e±ciency of
employed workers relative to unemployed workers and students. Finally, we allow
¸ to be dependent on individual characteristics, i.e. ¸ = exp(x¯¸).
The costs functions of job search for unemployed workers and students and
for employed workers follow
cu(s) = exp(cs) ¡ 1 and ce(s) = exp(Ãccs) ¡ 1 s ¸ 0







These costs functions equal 0 if an individual does not devote any e®ort to job
search and are increasing in s. Like in Fougµ ere, Pradel and Roger (2002) we
allow for some unobserved heterogeneity in this costs function. In particular, the
parameter c can take the values of some mass points c1;:::;ck with probabilities
p1;:::;pk (under the restriction p1 + ¢¢¢ + pk = 1).
We do not parameterize the initial costs of job search C0 as this can easily be
estimated nonparametrically. We return to the issue in Subsection 6.1.
4 Data
Our data are from a survey of individuals who completed undergraduate educa-
tion in the Netherlands.5 The survey is a written questionnaire which contains
questions on education, job search behavior, work history and personal char-
acteristics. Each year in January or February individuals are interviewed who
graduated in the academic year two years earlier. For example the sample col-
lected in January 1999 contains individuals who graduated between September
1996 and August 1997. Individuals are interviewed only once and all information
is retrospective. The data contain 7 cohorts, interviewed between 1997 and 2003.
Yearly around 10,000 questionnaires are sent out and the response rate is between
40 and 45 percent.
Using these cohorts, we take all individuals who graduated in economics,
business administration, Dutch law and psychology. Since our model describes
individuals who ¯rst enter the labor market, we exclude individuals who did part-
time education, were over age 30 at the moment of graduation, and who were
full-time working before graduation. This results in a data set of 4505 individuals.
Furthermore, we exclude 36 individuals, who are unemployed at the moment
5For each study a random sample of graduates is selected from the administration of the
organization that coordinates enrollment of students at all Dutch universities and that makes
the payments of government grants to students.
18Table 2: The average real monthly net wage of employed individuals at the mo-
ment of the questionnaire (in euros in February 1997).
Year of interview
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Economics 1301 1321 1337 1435 1426 1544 1392
Business 1345 1317 1387 1440 1422 1500 1449
Dutch Law 1274 1243 1279 1359 1402 1500 1356
Psychology 1102 1081 1200 1196 1173 1219 1220
of the interview, never searched for work and report not to be interested in
working, and 107 individuals whose answers are inconsistent, for example the
moment of starting job search is later than the moment they started working
or the second job started before the ¯rst job. Next we exclude 398 individuals
with item nonresponse in the month of graduation or the moment of starting job
search. Finally, we exclude 430 individuals who started working freelance, in a
family company or their own company, became Ph.D. student or continued with
another study. For obvious reasons these individuals do not behave as described
by our model, for example they do not have to send application letters to ¯nd
work. In total the reduced data set includes 3534 individuals. Table 1 provides
the sample sizes strati¯ed by study. Individuals within a particular studies can be
considered as relatively homogeneous, but there is de¯nitely serious heterogeneity
between the groups of students in di®erent studies.
Let us ¯rst consider the individual's situation at the moment of the interview.
An individual is considered to be employed if he has a job that contains at least
12 contractual working hours. For individuals with a study in economics, business
administration or Dutch law employment rates at the moment of the interview
are close to 1. For psychology graduates, employment rates at the moment of the
interview display an increasing trend over the observation period, from around
0.85 in 1997 to over 0.95 in 2002 and 2003. Conditional on being employed, almost
all individuals work full time, the average number of weekly contractual working
hours is between 38 and 40 for economics, business administration and Dutch
law graduates and about 34 for psychology graduates. For all groups there are
no trends over calendar time.
Table 2 provides the real net monthly wages paid at the moment of the survey.
These wages are measured in euros in February 1997 (the month of the ¯rst wave
of the survey). Wages of psychology graduates are typically lower than wages
for the other groups. The general picture is that there is an upward trend in
real wages (for all groups of graduates) until 2002 and a (small) drop in 2003.
19This picture follows the general business cycle closely. Increasing wages can be
caused by less frictions in the labor market, i.e. individuals receive more job o®ers.
Therefore, we look at the percentage of individuals who switched jobs at least
once before the interview.6 This job turnover rate is highest among psychology
graduates, around 60 percent of the individuals had at least 2 jobs during the
observation period and it shows a slightly increasing trend. For all groups about
40 to 45 percent of the individuals held more than 1 job. The data are not only
informative on the wage in the job at the moment of the interview, but also on
the wage in the ¯rst job after graduation. The real wage in this ¯rst job follows
the same pattern as the current real wage.
The survey asks individuals in which month they graduated and in which
month they started searching for work. There does not seem to be any trend
in the number of months that students start job search prior to graduation.
However, there are some di®erences between the groups of students. Around 75
percent of the economics and business administration graduates start searching
for work before graduation and almost 60 percent started at least 3 months before
graduation. For Dutch law and psychology these percentages are lower, around
65 percent start before graduation and slightly less than 50 percent started at
least 3 months before graduation.
We see a similar picture for the fraction of students that works immediately
upon graduation. There is no clear trend in this fraction within the di®erent
groups of graduates, but there are some di®erences between the groups of grad-
uates. The ranking of the groups by the fraction of working immediately upon
graduation largely coincides with the ranking by the fraction that starts job
search early. In particular, around 43 percent of the economics and business ad-
ministration graduates already have work at the moment of graduation, while ap-
proximately 33 percent of the Dutch law and psychology graduates start working
immediately after graduating. Even though the fraction that works immediately
upon graduation is relatively constant over the years, there is in the earlier sur-
veys a downward trend in the fraction of individuals that is still unemployed 6
months after graduation.
The data contain information both about the number of job applications and
about the number of job interviews. In the ¯rst two surveys individuals were asked
about the total number of job applications and job interviews until the moment
the ¯rst job was accepted. Since 1999 individuals have to report the total number
of job applications and job interviews until the moment of the interview. In our
empirical analyses we use the number of job applications as a measure for job
6In the questionnaire it is explicitly mentioned that individuals should consider job changes
within a ¯rm as job-to-job transitions.
20Table 3: Number of job applications.
Year of interview
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Economics 13:4 12:1 11:6 7:8 5:2 4:7 5:6
Business 9:5 11:8 11:1 8:4 6:0 7:5 9:0
Dutch law 16:8 16:6 15:6 9:8 7:3 5:1 7:0
Psychology 13:3 17:5 14:3 9:9 15:1 13:1 11:0
Explanatory note: In the 1997 and 1998 surveys individuals were asked to report the number of job applications
until accepting the ¯rst job. Since 1999 individuals have to report the total number of job applications until the
moment of the survey.
search intensity. In Table 3 we present the average number of job applications
per group of graduates. For all groups, except for psychology graduates, we see
a downward trend in the number of job applications. In our empirical analyses
we do not use the number of job interviews, but it is interesting to look at job
interviews as these provides some insight in the tightness of the labor market.
The number of job interviews is relatively constant over time, which implies that
in the later years individuals needed less job applications to generate the same
number of job interviews. Psychology students need on average the most job
applications for obtaining one job interview.
The variables discussed above are the endogenous variables in our structural
model. As mentioned in Subsection 3.3 we allow for observed heterogeneity in the
job o®er arrival rate and the wage o®er distribution. Since we will estimate the
model separately for each study, the samples are already relatively homogeneous.
Due to business cycle variation individuals who graduated in di®erent years faced
di®erent labor market conditions. To capture this business cycle variation we use
GDP growth and the unemployment rate. We also include a dummy variable for
being older than 25 years at the moment of graduation. If an individual is over
25 years old at the moment of graduation, this indicates that either the students
entered university via the higher vocational school track or stayed in university
for a long time. During our observation period there is a negative trend in the
average age at graduation. This negative trend coincides with the shortening
of the entitlement period of the government grants (see Section 2). There is
no indication that students stayed in university shorter as a consequence of the
improved labor market conditions in the later years of the observation period. We
include dummy variables for medium grades and for high grades in university. In
our sample approximately 53 percent have medium grades and 21 percent high
grades. In psychology the percentage of graduates with high grades is slightly
21higher than in the other studies, but all percentages are constant over time. We
also have information on high school grades, but these are not informative in
addition to university grades.
About 53 percent of the individuals in our sample are men. There are large
variations between studies. In economics 75 percent of the graduates are men,
while in psychology this is only 17 percent. About 50 percent of the individuals
have a father with either a degree from higher vocational school or a degree from
university. This percentage is the same across studies and over time. And ¯nally
we include the region at which an individual lives. We distinguish between living
in the west of the Netherlands or the rest of the Netherlands. The west area is
the most urbanized area containing the four largest cities in Holland. In this area
there are supposed to be more jobs available for university graduates and average
wages are also higher. In our sample 65 percent of the individuals live in the west,
while 55 percent of the individuals graduated from a university in the west.
5 Reduced-form analyses
In this section we test some predictions of the theoretical model by performing
reduced-form analyses.
The theoretical model predicts that conditional on actively searching for the
¯rst job, the probability of ¯nding work is per period higher after graduation
than before graduation (see Proposition 5). Prior to graduation individuals devote
less e®ort to job search and have higher reservation wages. We use a bivariate
hazard rate model to investigate this model prediction. The ¯rst hazard describes
the transition from not searching to actively searching and the second hazard
described the transition from actively searching to ¯nding work. Both hazards are
speci¯ed in discrete time following logit speci¯cations, containing both observed
and unobserved heterogeneity. We allow for interdependency between the hazards
22by allowing the unobserved heterogeneity terms to be correlated.7
The estimation results are presented in Table 4. For none of the groups we
¯nd relevant unobserved heterogeneity in the transition describing the moment
students start searching actively for their ¯rst job. Conditional on actively search-
ing for work the probability of ¯nding work in a speci¯c month is signi¯cantly
smaller before graduation than afterwards. This results con¯rms our theoretical
model and holds for all four groups.
It is interesting to pay some attention to the e®ect of the business cycle
indicators on the moment of starting job search. In our framework the e®ect of the
business cycle in the model runs via the job o®er arrival rate and the median wage
o®er. The e®ect of improved business cycle conditions on the optimal moment at
which students start searching for work is ambiguous. Simulation experiments of
our theoretical model show that the direction in which business cycle conditions
a®ects the optimal moment of starting job search depends mainly on the variance
of the wage o®er distribution. If this variance is small, improved business cycle
conditions cause students to start searching for work later (in particular if the
job o®er arrival rate is high).
For psychology students better labor market conditions in the sense of a lower
unemployment rate or higher GDP growth cause that students start searching
for work later. For all other groups lower unemployment rates have a negative
e®ect while higher GDP growth has a positive e®ect, making the total e®ect of
a change in the labor market conditions ambiguous. Recall from Figures 3 and
4 that during the observation period the variance in GDP growth and in the
unemployment rate are of the same magnitude. Therefore, for business adminis-
tration students the e®ect of the unemployment rate dominates, implying that
also business administration students start job search on average later in periods
of better business cycle conditions. For economics and Dutch law students there
is no dominating business cycle e®ect.
7The probability that a students who has not devoted any e®ort to job search yet starts
searching ¿ periods before graduation equals
exp(¸(¿) + x0¯s + vs)
1 + exp(¸(¿) + x0¯s + vs)
where ¸(¿) denotes piecewise constant duration dependence. The probability that an individual
who is actively searching ¯nds a job in a particular period equals
exp(±I(¿ > 0) + x0¯w + vw)
1 + exp(±I(¿ > 0) + x0¯w + vw)
The parameter ± describes the di®erence in job ¯nding probabilities before and after graduation.
The unobserved heterogeneity follows a bivariate distribution with discrete-mass point.
23Table 4: Results of the reduced-form transition model.
Economics Business Dutch law Psychology
Transition to active job search
Medium grades 0:061 0:049 ¡0:122 ¡0:173
(0:128) (0:175) (0:149) (0:191)
High grades 0:091 0:144 ¡0:368 0:036
(0:164) (0:222) (0:189) (0:211)
Male 0:034 0:146 ¡0:034 0:172
(0:126) (0:145) (0:138) (0:190)
Higher education father 0:074 0:090 ¡0:189 0:135
(0:115) (0:141) (0:130) (0:138)
Older than 25 years ¡0:157 0:024 ¡0:044 ¡0:087
(0:130) (0:155) (0:139) (0:163)
West ¡0:029 ¡0:198 ¡0:175 0:014
(0:122) (0:144) (0:137) (0:138)
Unemployment rate 0:079 0:136 0:028 0:146
(0:039) (0:046) (0:041) (0:042)
GDP growth 0:062 0:047 0:032 ¡0:045
(0:029) (0:037) (0:032) (0:038)
Duration dependence
More than 16 months before graduation ¡4:164 ¡5:224 ¡5:025 ¡3:879
(0:457) (0:597) (0:592) (0:982)
13-15 months before graduation ¡3:072 ¡3:572 ¡3:850 ¡2:701
(0:438) (0:506) (0:525) (0:961)
9-12 months before graduation ¡1:699 ¡2:134 ¡1:986 ¡1:545
(0:402) (0:453) (0:413) (0:936)
7-11 months before graduation ¡0:736 ¡1:110 ¡0:767 ¡0:203
(0:394) (0:438) (0:398) (0:926)
4-6 months before graduation 0:014 ¡0:301 0:150 0:631
(0:393) (0:438) (0:402) (0:926)
After 3 months before graduation 0 0 0 0
Transition into ¯rst job
Medium grades 0:086 0:183 ¡0:314 ¡0:360
(0:159) (0:189) (0:162) (0:282)
High grades ¡0:010 0:014 0:107 ¡0:388
(0:195) (0:242) (0:206) (0:301)
Male ¡0:248 ¡0:253 ¡0:160 ¡0:260
(0:154) (0:162) (0:151) (0:272)
Higher education father ¡0:106 0:207 0:042 ¡0:094
(0:138) (0:161) (0:142) (0:191)
Older than 25 years ¡0:137 ¡0:051 ¡0:274 0:312
(0:156) (0:173) (0:152) (0:222)
West 0:165 ¡0:243 0:326 0:015
(0:147) (0:164) (0:145) (0:196)
Unemployment rate ¡0:096 0:041 ¡0:074 ¡0:070
(0:049) (0:053) (0:043) (0:057)
GDP growth 0:028 0:053 0:033 ¡0:052
(0:036) (0:042) (0:034) (0:050)
Before graduation ¡1:481 ¡1:408 ¡0:941 ¡2:246
(0:248) (0:267) (0:239) (0:856)
After graduation 0 0 0 0
24Table 4: (Continued).
Economics Business Dutch law Psychology
Unobserved heterogeneity
vs ¡1:481 ¡1:408 ¡0:941 ¡2:246
(0:248) (0:267) (0:239) (0:856)
v1
w 1 ¡0:475 1 1
(0:319)
v2
w 0:025 ¡0:478 ¡0:442 ¡0:356
(0:387) (0:531) (0:339) (0:471)
P(Vs = v1
s) 0:201 0:662 0:101 0:439
(0:061) (17:407) (0:055) (0:050)
P(Vs = v2
s) 0:799 0:338 0:899 0:561
(0:243) (8:901) (0:494) (0:064)
According to our theoretical model before graduation the reservation wage is
decreasing as the moment of graduation approaches. After graduation the reser-
vation wage is constant. Therefore conditional on having a job at graduation, the
wage is positively correlated with the potential search duration (i.e. the duration
between the start of active search for work and the moment of graduation). For
individuals who start working after graduation, the moment of starting in the
¯rst job is not informative on the wage.
Table 5 shows results from two regressions. First, conditional on having work
at graduation the ¯rst wage is regressed on the potential search duration and
individual characteristics. Second, conditional on starting working after gradua-
tion, we regress the wage in the ¯rst job on the duration between the moment
of graduation and the moment of starting the ¯rst job and individual character-
istics. The potential search duration has a positive (although not for all groups
signi¯cant) e®ect on the wage in the ¯rst job for individuals who start working
immediately upon graduation. This con¯rms our theoretical model. For individ-
uals who found a job after graduation we do not ¯nd evidence that the wage in
the ¯rst job is correlated to the search duration. For economics and psychology
graduates the coe±cient is negative and it is positive for the other two groups.
Our theoretical model predicts that the decision to search on the job depends
only on the wage. Proposition 6 of the theoretical model shows that only in case
the wage in a job exceeds a threshold value an individual does not devote any
e®ort to job search. From our data we can construct which individuals search
actively on the job in their ¯rst job. First, all individuals who had at least two
jobs must have searched on the job in their ¯rst job. Second, in the questionnaire
it is asked at the moment of the interview the individual actively searches for
a new job. Only in case an individual is at the moment of the interview still in
his ¯rst job and reports not to search actively for work, this individual did not
25Table 5: Results of regression on wage in the ¯rst job.
Economics Business Dutch law Psychology
Job found before graduation
Intercept 7:154 7:216 7:268 7:107
(0:052) (0:070) (0:067) (0:117)
Period between start job search and graduation 0:010 0:006 0:002 0:012
(in months) (0:003) (0:004) (0:004) (0:008)
Medium grades 0:065 0:074 ¡0:032 0:114
(0:024) (0:033) (0:036) (0:068)
High grades 0:094 0:053 0:028 0:078
(0:030) (0:041) (0:043) (0:070)
Male 0:067 0:064 0:035 0:028
(0:022) (0:027) (0:030) (0:069)
Higher education father 0:041 ¡0:001 0:049 0:031
(0:021) (0:027) (0:029) (0:048)
Older than 25 years 0:017 ¡0:002 0:028 0:055
(0:023) (0:029) (0:033) (0:059)
West 0:015 0:068 0:039 ¡0:001
(0:022) (0:027) (0:032) (0:050)
Unemployment rate ¡0:026 ¡0:036 ¡0:035 ¡0:032
(0:006) (0:009) (0:009) (0:014)
GDP growth ¡0:003 ¡0:003 ¡0:005 0:010
(0:006) (0:008) (0:007) (0:014)
Job found after graduation
Intercept 7:204 7:246 7:293 7:102
(0:050) (0:068) (0:067) (0:118)
Period between graduation and start ¯rst job ¡0:012 0:002 0:009 ¡0:023
(in months) (0:006) (0:008) (0:008) (0:014)
Medium grades 0:068 0:070 ¡0:030 0:126
(0:024) (0:033) (0:036) (0:068)
High grades 0:097 0:052 0:029 0:087
(0:030) (0:041) (0:042) (0:070)
Male 0:067 0:068 0:034 0:015
(0:023) (0:027) (0:030) (0:070)
Higher education father 0:045 0:000 0:047 0:033
(0:021) (0:027) (0:029) (0:048)
Older than 25 years 0:006 0:000 0:029 0:054
(0:024) (0:029) (0:033) (0:059)
West 0:017 0:071 0:035 0:000
(0:022) (0:027) (0:032) (0:050)
Unemployment rate ¡0:027 ¡0:035 ¡0:035 ¡0:027
(0:006) (0:009) (0:009) (0:014)
GDP growth ¡0:004 ¡0:004 ¡0:005 0:008
(0:006) (0:008) (0:007) (0:014)
26Table 6: Results of probit model for active job search in ¯rst job.
Economics Business Dutch law Psychology
Intercept 18.243 19.838 21.865 7.484
( 1.522) ( 2.036) ( 1.931) ( 1.708)
Log wage in ¯rst job -2.710 -2.880 -3.119 -0.967
( 0.212) ( 0.281) ( 0.267) ( 0.227)
Employment duration until interview 0.828 0.953 0.696 0.658
(in years) ( 0.098) ( 0.126) ( 0.117) ( 0.129)
Medium grades 0.107 0.225 -0.147 0.025
( 0.094) ( 0.135) ( 0.134) ( 0.196)
High grades 0.242 0.068 -0.303 -0.122
( 0.121) ( 0.171) ( 0.156) ( 0.204)
Male 0.090 0.089 -0.373 -0.428
( 0.090) ( 0.113) ( 0.110) ( 0.176)
Higher education father 0.184 -0.066 -0.052 -0.071
( 0.081) ( 0.110) ( 0.107) ( 0.131)
Older than 25 years 0.273 0.302 0.364 0.102
( 0.094) ( 0.126) ( 0.120) ( 0.154)
West 0.190 0.086 0.138 -0.128
( 0.084) ( 0.113) ( 0.116) ( 0.133)
GDP growth -0.033 -0.073 0.001 -0.060
( 0.026) ( 0.035) ( 0.032) ( 0.039)
Unemployment rate -0.016 -0.045 0.024 -0.029
( 0.022) ( 0.031) ( 0.026) ( 0.039)
search on the job in his ¯rst job.
In Table 6 we provide results from a probit model for actively searching for
work in the ¯rst job. As regressors we include the wage in the ¯rst job, individual
characteristics and the employment duration until the moment of the interview.
The employment duration is the interval between the moment of starting the
¯rst job and the moment of the interview. According to our theoretical model, if
it is bene¯cial for individuals to search on the job, they start immediately upon
accepting the job. The estimation results show that indeed for all groups the
observed wage in the ¯rst job has a signi¯cant negative e®ect on searching on
the job. However, also for all groups the impact of the employment duration is
signi¯cantly larger than 0. This suggests that after accepting a job individuals
might wait some period before they start searching for a new job. Alternatively,
individuals with short employment duration found their ¯rst job late and might
have high search costs (recall the unobserved heterogeneity in the search costs
function).
The theoretical model predicts that conditional on observing the wage in the
¯rst job, the wage in the second job does not depend on the duration in the
¯rst job. The wage in the second job is a draw from the distribution function
Fe(wjw > w1), where w1 denotes the wage in the ¯rst job. The wage in the
second job is thus positively correlated to the wage in the ¯rst job. The wage in
27Table 7: Results from regression on the logarithm of the observed wage in the
second job.
Economics Business Dutch law Psychology
Intercept 4:381 3:996 5:668 5:665
(0:276) (0:381) (0:294) (0:336)
Log wage in ¯rst job 0:411 0:460 0:235 0:235
(0:039) (0:054) (0:041) (0:045)
First job duration (in years) 0:019 0:007 0:017 ¡0:008
(0:017) (0:019) (0:019) (0:032)
Medium grades 0:042 0:020 0:007 ¡0:030
(0:021) (0:026) (0:023) (0:044)
High grades 0:030 ¡0:022 0:033 ¡0:003
(0:026) (0:034) (0:026) (0:048)
Male 0:011 0:048 0:004 0:037
(0:020) (0:021) (0:019) (0:043)
Higher education father 0:031 0:021 0:046 0:066
(0:018) (0:021) (0:018) (0:031)
Older than 25 years 0:033 0:023 ¡0:006 ¡0:054
(0:020) (0:023) (0:020) (0:036)
West 0:012 ¡0:036 0:030 ¡0:034
(0:019) (0:021) (0:020) (0:031)
GDP growth 0:001 ¡0:001 ¡0:007 ¡0:008
(0:005) (0:005) (0:005) (0:009)
Unemployment rate ¡0:018 0:001 ¡0:028 ¡0:016
(0:006) (0:007) (0:006) (0:010)
the second job is only observed if individuals actually found a second job in the
observation period.
In Table 7 we show estimation results from regressing the logarithm of the
wage in the second job on the logarithm of the wage in the ¯rst job, the ¯rst job
duration, and individual characteristics. Indeed for all groups we ¯nd a strong
positive correlation between the observed wage in the ¯rst job and the observed
wage in the second job. And as predicted from the theoretical model for none of
the groups the observed duration in the ¯rst job has a signi¯cant impact on the
wage in the second job.
6 Estimation of the structural model
In this section we discuss the estimation of the structural parameters ¸, Ã¸, ¹,
Ã¹, ¾, c, Ãc and C0.
6.1 Preliminary issues
The key problem of estimating the model is that at any point in time the present
value of work Re(w) enters the decision problem of the individual (see Section 3).
28Because the model does not provide a closed-form solution for Re(w), we need to
approximate Re(w).
Proposition 6 shows that there exists a wage level ¹ w above which employed









(Re(x) ¡ Re( ¹ w))dFe(x)
Because employed workers receiving wages w above ¹ w stay in their job forever,
their present value of work Re(w) equals w=½. Furthermore, we have parameter-
ized c0
e(0) = Ãcc and ¸0









(x ¡ ¹ w)dFe(x)
Since Fe(w) is speci¯ed as a lognormal distribution function, the integral on the
right-hand side can be solved analytically.
Given that an employed worker earns a wage w less than ¹ w, the condition
for the optimal job search e®ort is given by equation (8). Solving this condition,
















For employed workers who are actively searching for work, the present value
of work Re(w) does not equal w=½, but instead is given by equation (7). If we
substitute in this equation the condition for optimal job search e®ort and the
parameterization, we get
½Re(w) = w ¡(exp(Ãccse(w))¡1)+(1¡exp(¡Ã¸¸se(w)))
Ãccexp(Ãccse(w))
Ã¸¸exp(¡Ã¸¸se(w))
Note that Re(w) depends on se(w), which depends on Re(x) for all x ¸ w.
Therefore, we cannot obtain analytical solutions for se(w) and Re(w). We tried
to approximate Re(w) by di®erent types of polynomials, but we could not ¯nd any
polynomial that had both an analytic solution for
R ¹ w
w (Re(x) ¡ Re(w))dFe(x) and
a su±ciently good ¯t.8 Therefore, we use a step-wise approximation for Re(w).
Note that if w ¸ ¹ w, then se(w) = 0 and Re(w) = w=½. Since Fe(w) follows a
lognormal distribution function there is an analytic solution for
R 1
¹ w (x¡ ¹ w)dFe(x).
8Bloemen (2004) approximates Re(x) ¡ Re(w) by (x ¡ w)=(½ + ¾). Christensen, Lentz,
Mortensen, Neumann and Werwatz (2005) use in an equilibrium search model an alternative
approximation for s(w) where they let s(w) iterate for di®erent values of w until a ¯xed point
was found. This method yields numerically equivalent results as our approximation.
29Next, taking the ¯rst-di®erence with respect to w of both the left-hand side and
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For a small ¢ we can approximate
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and se(w ¡ ¢) follows from substituting the approximation for this integral in
equation (9). So if we start from Re(¹ w) = ¹ w=½, se(¹ w) = 0 and the analytic
solution for
R 1
¹ w Re(x) ¡ Re( ¹ w)dFe(x), we can approximate Re(w) and se(w) by
the recursive formulas above. This approximation provides the behavior of the
individual when being employed. Next, we should determine the reservation wage
Á when being unemployed (after graduation) and the amount of search e®ort
su(Á).















So we can ¯nd Á by solving




The left-hand side is an increasing function in Á and the right-hand side is a
decreasing function in Á. The only numerical complication is that the integral on
the right-hand side is taken with respect to Fu(¢) instead of Fe(¢). Finally, we can
use equation (2) and equation (3) to determine the reservation wage path and
the amount of job search e®ort each period before graduation.
We assume that wages are observed with measurement error. Let ~ w denote the
observed wage and w is the true wage. These are related according to log( ~ w) =
log(w) + ", where " is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance ¾2
".
Job search e®ort does not have a natural unit. Naturally, one interprets e®ort
as hours spent searching for work, however are data are not informative on this.
30Therefore, like Bloemen (2004) we use the number of job applications as a measure
for job search. Since making a job application does not always take the same
number of hours, we assume that the number of job applications measures job
search e®ort with an error, which has the same properties as the measurement
error for observed wages, it is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance ¾2
s.
6.2 Estimation
Our estimation procedure proceeds in two steps. The advantage of a two-step
estimation procedure is that we can estimate the initial costs of job search C0
non parametrically. In the ¯rst step of our estimation procedure, we condition
on the optimal moment of starting job search. We use the data on job search
spells, employment spells, wages and the observed amount of job search e®ort
to estimate the parameters ¸, c, Ã¸, Ãc, ¹, Ã¹, ¾, ¾" and ¾s. In the second step
we use the starting date of job search to estimate the distribution function of
C0. For the ease of presentation we suppress covariates and ignore unobserved
heterogeneity in the remainder of this subsection. Because we observe individuals
from the start of their career, we do not face initial conditions problems.
Step 1: estimation of ¸, Ã¸, c, Ãc, ¹, Ã¹, ¾, ¾" and ¾s In the ideal case, we
observe for each individual the job search duration before graduation, the period
of being unemployed, the number of job applications, the wage in the ¯rst job,
the length of the ¯rst job spell, the wage in the second job, etc.9 Unfortunately,
we do not observe exact job spells, instead we observe the date at which an
individual started working in the ¯rst job and in the current job, the ¯rst wage
and current wage, and whether an individual has had one, two, or more jobs
before the interview. So for individuals who had more than two jobs, we lack
information.10 To keep the likelihood function trackable, we use only information
until accepting the second job. If an individual had more than two jobs, we use
the wage in the ¯rst job and the duration of the ¯rst job spell, i.e. the ¯rst job
spell ended at least before the current job started.
Individual likelihood contributions depend on the information observed for
an individual, for example whether or not the ¯rst job was found before or after
9Recall from Section 4 that in the 1997 and 1998 surveys individuals were asked about the
number of job applications until accepting the ¯rst job and in the later surveys individuals had
to report all job applications until the moment of the interview. We take account of this in the
estimation.
10Around 12 percent of the individuals had more than two jobs before the interview. This
percentage is highest among psychology graduates with almost 22 percent.
31graduation and the number of jobs. We will not show the likelihood contributions
for all possible combinations. Instead, we provide insight in the likelihood function
by showing some elements.
Let ¿0 denote the period that a student starts searching previous to graduation
and let t0 denote the duration of the search period until ¯nding the ¯rst job. If the
unemployed worker accepted his ¯rst job after graduation (t0 > ¿0), the likelihood








If the individual started working immediately upon graduation, the likelihood







For individuals who did not search for work before graduation ¿0 is set to 0.
If an individual had only one job in the observation period, we observe that
this individual received a wage ~ w1 and stayed in this job for t1 periods. If the job
























Because the true wages in the ¯rst job is not observed, we integrate over all
possible wages in the ¯rst job, with the reservation wage Á (at the moment of
accepting the job) as lower bound. This integral requires numerical integration.
The absence of an analytical solution is due to the distribution of the duration of
the censored job spell, (1¡µe(w1))t1. If the individual had two jobs, the likelihood














































As the true wages in both the ¯rst and second job are not observed, the likelihood
contribution contains two integrals. The upper bound in the integral over all
possible wages in the ¯rst job is now the maximum wage ¹ w at which the individual
32continues on-the-job search. The second integral is over all possible true wages in
the second job, the true wage in the second job should exceed the true wage in
the ¯rst job. The second integral is the convolution of a lognormal distribution
and a truncated lognormal distribution function, which has a relatively simple
closed-form solution.
Consider that we observe that an individual made ¹ s job applications until the
moment of the interview. For ease of exposition we only discuss the likelihood
contribution for an individual who had only one job during the observation period
and found this job after graduation
R 1
Á `(~ sjt1;w1;t2)`( ~ w1jw1)`(w1)dw1
R 1
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The search e®ort before graduation su(Á¿), after graduation su(Á) and while
being employed se(w1) are computed using the recursive formulas discussed in
Subsection 6.1. The integral in the denominator has a closed-form solution, but
the integral in the numerator does not have a closed-form solution as it depends
on the true amount of search e®ort. Therefore, this term should be approximated
numerically. Similarly, we can derive likelihood contributions for individuals, who
never found work and for individuals who had two jobs until the interview.
The only complication in the likelihood contributions above is that some indi-
viduals started working immediately upon graduation. In that case, the relevant
reservation wage does not equal Á, but the reservation wage at the moment of
accepting the ¯rst job. If the individual started working immediately upon grad-
uation, we summarize over the possible time period in which the individual could
have accepted the job.
Step 2: estimation of the distribution function of C0 In this step we use
the observed month of starting job search to estimate the ¯xed costs of starting
job search C0. Proposition 3 states that the optimal moment of starting job search
is a monotone function of C0. The optimal moment of starting job search is given
33by equation (4). Given ¿0 we can bound C0 by
1
½(1 + ½)¿0 (Re(Á¿0+2) ¡ Re(Á¿0+1)) · C0 ·
1
½(1 + ½)¿0¡1 (Re(Á¿0+1) ¡ Re(Á¿0))
For all individuals who started searching for work before graduation, we can
compute both bounds for C0. Recall from Section (3) that individuals who did
not start searching for work before graduation receive utility from not working
immediately after graduation. This implies that the behavior of these individuals
is not informative about C0. For each study we compute the density function of
C0 and we use kernel smoothing to obtain a relatively smooth density function
of C0.
7 Results
In this section we discuss the estimation results of the structural model. First, we
provide the parameter estimates and discuss the ¯t of the model. Next, we focus
on the returns to early work experience.
7.1 Parameter estimates
Students in di®erent studies di®er from each other and these di®erences are most
likely not fully captured by the observed individual characteristics. Therefore, we
will not focus on the returns to the di®erent studies. Individual characteristics
are mainly used as control variables, without giving strong causal interpretations
to covariate e®ects. Table 8 provides the parameter estimates of the structural
model.
The Â2-tests show that individual characteristics are important for economics
and business administration students in explaining di®erences in job o®er ar-
rival rates ¸. For business graduates, individual characteristics are only jointly
signi¯cant at a 10%-level. For all groups individual characteristics are jointly sig-
ni¯cant in the wage o®er distribution. Often covariates have opposite e®ects on
the job o®er arrival rate and the wage o®er distribution, for example, individuals
with low grades have at a given search e®ort higher job o®er arrival probabilities
(although not signi¯cantly) than individuals with high grades who receive on av-
erage higher wage o®ers. In most cases the impact on the wage o®er distribution
dominates in explaining labor market prospects, i.e. at graduation individuals
with high grades have higher reservation wages than individuals with low grades.
The opposite impact of covariates on the job o®er arrival rate and the wage o®er
distribution can be explained from individual search behavior. Individuals with
34Table 8: Results of the structural model.
Economics Business Dutch law Psychology
Job o®er arrival rate ¸
Intercept ¡1:155 ¡1:133 ¡1:567 ¡1:185
(0:210) (0:247) (0:250) (0:249)
Individual characteristics
Average level of grades in study
Medium grades ¡0:187 0:008 ¡0:113 ¡0:027
(0:081) (0:111) (0:099) (0:116)
High grades ¡0:066 0:018 ¡0:050 ¡0:122
(0:108) (0:145) (0:127) (0:128)
Male ¡0:200 ¡0:239 ¡0:160 ¡0:118
(0:085) (0:093) (0:089) (0:129)
Higher education father ¡0:074 ¡0:083 ¡0:100 ¡0:014
(0:071) (0:089) (0:085) (0:089)
Older than 25 years ¡0:025 ¡0:054 ¡0:085 ¡0:097
(0:078) (0:100) (0:094) (0:099)
West 0:182 ¡0:096 0:141 0:099
(0:073) (0:092) (0:098) (0:088)
Â2-test statistic for joint signi¯cance 19:7 11:6 8:6 4:3
Business cycle variation
GDP growth 0:007 0:014 0:022 ¡0:008
(0:018) (0:023) (0:021) (0:025)
Unemployment rate ¡0:006 0:004 ¡0:030 ¡0:102
(0:026) (0:030) (0:031) (0:030)
Â2-test statistic for joint signi¯cance 0:4 0:4 3:7 22:5
Explanatory note: The Â2-test statistic for joint signi¯cance is based on a Wald-test.
35Table 8: (Continued).
Economics Business Dutch law Psychology
Mean log earnings level ¹
Intercept 7:231 7:153 7:231 7:289
(0:029) (0:037) (0:034) (0:051)
Individual characteristics
Average level of grades in study
Medium grades 0:060 0:048 0:034 0:014
(0:012) (0:016) (0:017) (0:032)
High grades 0:088 0:063 0:034 0:049
(0:015) (0:021) (0:022) (0:034)
Male 0:042 0:065 0:005 0:022
(0:012) (0:014) (0:014) (0:029)
Higher education father 0:043 0:001 0:060 0:052
(0:011) (0:014) (0:014) (0:022)
Older than 25 years 0:024 0:006 0:034 ¡0:023
(0:012) (0:015) (0:014) (0:025)
West 0:013 0:061 0:049 ¡0:058
(0:011) (0:014) (0:016) (0:022)
Â2-test statistic for joint signi¯cance 74:8 51:9 48:1 18:2
Business cycle variation
GDP growth 0:002 ¡0:001 ¡0:004 ¡0:006
(0:003) (0:004) (0:004) (0:006)
Unemployment rate ¡0:031 ¡0:025 ¡0:037 ¡0:031
(0:003) (0:004) (0:004) (0:007)
Â2-test statistic for joint signi¯cance 103:4 41:0 75:2 22:6
Explanatory note: The Â2-test statistic for joint signi¯cance is based on a Wald-test.
36Table 8: (Continued).
Economics Business Dutch law Psychology
Additional parameters
c1 0:774 1:173 0:746 0:899
(0:103) (0:283) (0:082) (0:119)
c2 3:126 3:519 2:923 3:256
(0:179) (0:291) (0:182) (0:238)
c3 10:745 14:468 13:943 16:611
(1:443) (2:212) (2:734) (4:017)
p1 0:114 0:119 0:202 0:227
(0:035) (0:061) (0:055) (0:070)
p2 0:769 0:770 0:740 0:726
(0:017) (0:019) (0:013) (0:013)
p3 0:117 0:110 0:058 0:047
(0:055) (0:048) (0:070) (0:083)
Ã¸ 2:302 2:301 6:972 5:205
(0:573) (0:593) (2:356) (1:308)
Ã¹ 1:012 1:015 1:007 1:005
(0:003) (0:004) (0:003) (0:003)
Ãc 20:365 11:695 22:166 10:752
(4:513) (2:433) (6:802) (2:236)
® 0:994 0:996 0:986 0:984
(0:002) (0:003) (0:004) (0:005)
¾ 0:078 0:132 0:125 0:131
(0:011) (0:015) (0:015) (0:017)
¾" 0:204 0:171 0:182 0:258
(0:004) (0:007) (0:006) (0:007)
¾s 0:763 0:803 0:836 0:774
(0:024) (0:032) (0:030) (0:036)
37favorable characteristics such as high grades might be looking for other types of
jobs. Indeed individuals with high grades more often ¯nd a ¯rst job that requires
university education.11 These jobs pay higher wages, but are more di±cult to ob-
tain. Furthermore, males and individuals whose father ¯nished higher education
receive better wage o®ers and have lower job o®er arrival rates than their coun-
terparts. For most groups labor market prospects are better in the west of the
Netherlands, which is in agreement with the empirical results of Bloemen (2004).
Both the job o®er arrival rate and the wage o®er distribution depend on the
state of the business cycle at the moment of graduation.12 The indicators for the
business cycle are GDP growth and the unemployment rate (see Figures 3 and 4).
Because almost all individuals ¯nd their job in the time interval from 6 months
prior to graduation until 6 months after graduation, we smooth the values for
GDP growth and the unemployment rate by taking their average values in this
time period. The correlation between the smoothed series of GDP growth and
the unemployment rate is ¡0:40. For all groups the unemployment rate is the
more important business cycle indicator than GDP growth. Mean wage o®ers
are signi¯cantly lower in periods with high unemployment. The impact of the
unemployment rate on the wage o®er distribution does not di®er much between
groups, a 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate lowers mean real
wage o®ers with approximately 3 percent. Between the mid-nineties and 2001 the
unemployment rate dropped from around 7 percent to 2 percent, implying that
real wage o®ers increased on average 15 percent. Only for psychology graduates
the business cycle has a signi¯cant impact on the job o®er arrival rate. A decrease
in the unemployment rate increases the probability of receiving a job o®er (at a
¯xed search e®ort).
It is interesting to pay some attention to the question why the business cycle
only a®ects the job o®er arrival rate of psychology graduates. Recall from Section
4 that labor market outcomes of psychology students are not as good as of the
other groups. This suggests that the labor market for psychology graduates is less
tight than for the other groups. Finding work has not been the main problem for
individuals who graduated in economics, business administration and Dutch law.
Therefore, the increased demand for skilled labor associated with the improved
11Our data contain some information on job characteristics, such as required level of education
and sector.
12Ideally, one would like the business cycle to have an ongoing e®ect on the job o®er arrival
rate and the wage o®er distribution. However, including such business cycle e®ects in the model
requires making assumptions about individuals' predictions of the business cycle and to what
extent they are aware of uncertainty concerning economic conditions. In such a model not
only the current state of the business cycle is relevant, but also beliefs about future economic
conditions directly enter the Bellman's equations described in Section 3.
38Figure 5: Optimal monthly job search e®ort (measured in job applications) at the


























business cycle conditions at the end of the nineties caused employers to raise
wages. This is expressed in the increased fraction of individuals who graduates
in economics, business administration and Dutch law that ¯nds a ¯rst job which
requires university education, i.e. this percentage increased from around 60 at
the beginning of the observation period until almost 70 in later years. Because
psychology graduates had more di±culties ¯nding work, improvements in the
business cycle made it more easy for them to ¯nd work. However, the percentage
of psychology graduates that ¯nd a ¯rst job which requires university education
has been around 50 percent in all years of the observation period. But in the later
years they indicate more often that the content of the job connects well to the
study.
Shimer (2004) argues that if labor market conditions improve, individuals
might lower their job search e®ort. In our model, the search environment is mainly
determined by the unemployment rate. In Figure 5 we show for all groups the
average optimal amount of search e®ort (at the moment of graduation condi-
tional on being unemployed) as a function of the unemployment rate. Dutch law
graduates make most job applications per month, on average they write almost
3 application letters per month, while business administration graduates make
only around 1.7 job application per month. The optimal amount of job search
e®ort is not sensitive to business cycle variation. This seems to contradict the
theoretical predictions of Shimer (2004). However, Shimer (2004) considers a set-
ting where the business cycle only directly a®ects the job o®er arrival rate. If










































this would be the case, we would ¯nd that higher unemployment increase search
e®ort. Our estimated probabilities of receiving a job o®er are much lower than
the values Shimer (2004) requires for obtaining his predictions. On average the
monthly probabilities of receiving a job o®er (at the optimal job search e®ort at
the moment of graduation) do not vary much over calendar time for individuals
who graduated in economics, business administration and Dutch law, these prob-
abilities are 0.13, 0.10 and 0.09 respectively. For psychology graduates there is
an increasing trend during the observation period in the probability of receiving
a job o®er. In the beginning of the observation period this probability was 0.09
and it increased to 0.11 at the end of the observation period.
In Figures 6 and 7 we show the estimated reservation wage at the moment of
graduation (Á) and the estimated lowest wage at which employed workers do not
devote any e®ort to job search ( ¹ w). The reservation wage at the moment of grad-
uation is a measure for the labor market prospects of students while the highest
wage at which employed workers still search for work re°ects the opportunities
for employed workers to ¯nd better paying jobs. Since unemployed individuals
do not change their job search e®ort over the business cycle, all behavioral re-
sponses to business cycle °uctuations are through changes in the reservation wage.
Reservation wages are highest for economics graduates and lowest for psychol-
ogy graduates. Individuals who graduated in business administration continue
searching up to a higher wage than the individuals in other groups. This is the
result of the relatively high variance in the wage o®er distribution ¾2.
40Figure 7: Changes in lowest wage at which individuals do not search on the job
























We allowed the variable costs of job search to depend on unobserved hetero-
geneity. For all groups we found a support of three mass points, where around
75 percent of the probability mass is located to the middle point. For economics
and business administration graduates around 11 percent of the individuals have
very high search costs, which is around 5 percent for Dutch law and psychology
graduates. The average °exible costs of a job application while being unemployed
are lowest for economics graduates with 150 euros per application and highest
for business administration graduates with 172 euros per application. Job search
is much more expensive for employed workers than for unemployed workers, the
estimates for Ãc are for all groups signi¯cantly larger than 1. This coincides with
the ¯nding of Bloemen (2004) and re°ects that the value of leisure is higher for
employed workers than for unemployed workers. However, a job application of an
employed worker is more likely to generate a job o®er than a job application of
an unemployed worker, Ã¸ is for all groups signi¯cantly larger than 1. It seems
that after accepting a ¯rst job more jobs become accessible. Bowlus, Kiefer and
Neumann (2001) ¯nd that the probability of receiving a job o®er is lower while
being employed than while being unemployed. Our results show this is only be-
cause employed workers face higher search costs and therefore make fewer job
applications. For all groups we ¯nd that on average wage o®ers are higher while
being employed, however this di®erence is not signi¯cant for psychology gradu-
ates. Quantitatively the di®erences are not very large. We return to this issue in
the next subsection.
We have allowed for non stationarity in the wage o®er distribution of students,
41Table 9: Observed and predicted distribution of number of jobs at moment of
survey and employment rate at graduation.
Economics Business Dutch law Psychology
pred. obs. pred. obs. pred. obs. pred. obs.
Number of jobs at survey date
No jobs 1:6 0:3 2:2 0:1 3:4 0:7 4:2 2:4
1 job 68:7 62:5 68:7 55:3 62:9 53:5 55:8 39:2
2 jobs 23:6 28:4 23:6 34:7 23:6 30:7 25:8 36:5
3 or more jobs 6:0 8:7 6:0 9:9 10:2 15:1 14:3 21:9
Employed rate at graduation 48:9 44:3 45:4 42:6 36:1 32:5 36:4 34:6
until three months prior to graduation the mean wage o®ers can di®er from the
period afterwards. This di®erence is given by the parameter ®. For all groups we
¯nd that on average wage o®ers are lower if the remaining time to graduation
exceeds three months. Employers are either not willing to commit for longer
periods or longer before graduation they are more uncertain about the skills of
a student. However, for all groups ® is close to 1 and for students in business
administration not even signi¯cantly di®erent. The uncertainty for employers is
not very large.
To get some insight in the performance of the model we report in Table 9
the observed and predicted number of jobs until the survey date and the em-
ployment rate at graduation. Our model slightly underpredicts job turnover as
measured by the number of jobs individuals have until the moment of the survey.
Furthermore, we somewhat overestimate the employment rate at the moment of
graduation. The estimated variance of the measurement error can be interpreted
as measure for the goodness of ¯t of the model. The variance in the logarithm of
the observed real wages equals 0.0569, 0.0521, 0.0631 and 0.0997 for economics,
business administration, Dutch law and psychology graduates respectively. Our
model explains 27 percent of the variance in the logarithm of wages for eco-
nomics graduates, 44 percent for business administration graduates, 48 percent
for Dutch law graduates and 33 percent for psychology graduates. Given that our
populations are very homogenous the ¯t of the wages seems reasonably good.
The variance in the observed number of job applications equals 0.8340, 0.9348,
1.0175 and 1.0676 for respectively economics, business administration, Dutch
law and psychology graduates. Comparing these variances to the variance in the
measurement errors ¾2
s implies that we can explain 31 percent of the variance in
job applications for economic, business administration and Dutch law graduates
and 44 percent for psychology graduates. There are three explanations why the
¯t is not better. First, we seem to underestimate the number of job applications
42for individuals with short search durations until the ¯rst job. Coles and Smith
(1998) argue that an individual who starts searching can make job applications
to the current stock of vacancies. After the individual is searching for a longer
period, the individual can only make job applications to the °ow of new vacancies.
For a individual who starts job search, ¯nding suitable vacancies is relatively
inexpensive and therefore individuals make many job applications in their ¯rst
search periods.
A second reason why measurement errors are relatively large is that many
individuals do not continue searching for work once they start their ¯rst job. In
the data 47 percent of the economics graduates did not continue searching on
the job after accepting the ¯rst job, and these percentages are 42, 40 and 21 for
business administration, Dutch law and psychology graduates respectively. Using
the model we can estimate the fraction of individuals that should search on the
job in the ¯rst job by Fu(w · ¹ wjw > Á), where Á is the reservation wage at the
moment of accepting the ¯rst job and ¹ w is the wage at which individuals quit
searching on the job. For all groups at any point in time more than 99 percent of
the individuals should search on the job in the ¯rst job.
There may be a number of reasons why individuals search less on the job
than predicted by our model. After accepting a job individuals may wait some
period before they start searching for a next job. Recall from Section 5 that the
probability of searching on the job in the ¯rst job depends on the job duration.
There might be a negative stigma attached to quitting a job soon after starting.
Also there may be some ¯xed costs associated to starting searching on the job.
Or it might be the case that ¯rms o®er tenure pro¯les, i.e. individuals know that
if they stay in a job their wage will increase gradually over time or that they
will get promoted after some period. However, recall that if someone changed
job within ¯rms, this should be registered as di®erent jobs. We performed a
simple regression of whether individuals continued searching in the ¯rst job on the
characteristics of the ¯rst job. This shows that for all groups the most important
reasons not to continue searching are having a permanent contract and the if
university education is required for the job. Psychology graduates are also less
likely to continue searching for work if the job contains more contractual hours
and if they work for the government.
A third possible reason why measurement errors are large is that students
might ¯nd their ¯rst job through an internship. In that case, an individual might
not have made any job application. Our data contains some information on the
channel through which the ¯rst job was found. For roughly 12 percent of the
university students the ¯rst job follows from an internship. For the studies we
consider these percentages are lower, for example 9 percent for economics, with




















































































the exception of psychology, where 16 percent of the ¯rst job followed after an
internship. Most university studies in the Netherlands do not require students to
do an internship, which can explain these low percentages.
Figure 8 presents the non-parametric densities of the startup costs for the
di®erent studies. In general, the estimated startup costs are large for all groups.
These high search startup costs imply that the model has di±culties explaining
why individuals start searching for work only shortly before graduation. Given
that labor market conditions are very favorable for university graduates, reason-
able startup costs between 1000 and 2000 euros imply that students should start
searching for work 2 years to 1 year before graduation. Hardly any student starts
searching for work this early. Employers might be reluctant to hire a student long
before graduation. This would imply that the job o®er arrival rate is not con-
stant before graduation, but increasing as the moment of graduation approaches
or there is more non stationarity in the wage o®er distribution than we allow
for. Since our data are not informative on the moment of accepting a job (be-
fore graduation), estimating more °exible non-stationary patterns is troublesome.
44An alternative explanation is that the time spent on searching for work before
graduation might be at the costs of study e®ort and therefore students postpone
searching for work.
Many students start searching for work relatively late and the majority of
the students becomes unemployed at graduation. It is interesting to see to what
extent the employment rate at graduation can be reduced if students would start
searching for work earlier. Let's consider a policy that forces all students to start
searching for work actively 6 months before graduation. Such a policy could for
example consist of a mandatory course on job search just before the ¯nal semester.
This policy increases employment rates at graduation substantially to 69 percent
for economics graduates, 70 percent for business administration graduates, 61
percent for Dutch law graduates and 64 percent for psychology graduates. These
percentages are remarkably close to each other, which suggests that the main
reason why employment rates at the moment of graduation for Dutch law and
psychology graduates are lower than for economics and business administration
graduates, is that they start searching for work later and not that they face more
di±culties ¯nding their ¯rst job.
7.2 Returns to early work experience
Our model describes individuals who ¯rst enter the labor market and who do
not have any relevant work experience. In the beginning of a career wages rise
faster than at any other point during the life cycle.13 Topel and Ward (1992)
address that wages of young workers may increase with experience even if the
true e®ect of work experience on labor market outcomes is zero. Labor market
frictions cause that it takes some time before new entrants in the labor market
reach the steady state. Wage increases in the beginning of a career may thus as
well be the result of labor market frictions as of accumulated work experience.
In our model work experience is represented by the parameters Ã¸ and Ã¹.
If these parameters equal 1, labor market conditions do not change after an
individual accepts his ¯rst job and all earnings increases are the consequence of
labor market frictions. Recall that for all groups there are signi¯cant returns to
work experience.
Substantial returns to work experience make the ¯rst job a stepping stone
towards better jobs. Therefore, individuals will be less selective concerning their
¯rst job, i.e. lower reservation wages. Because they also devote more e®ort to
job search, transition rates to work increase and employment rates just after
13See Figure 1 in Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2001), which shows that for all levels of
education individuals have sharp increases in earnings at the beginning of their career.
45Table 10: Results from simulation experiments on the importance on true returns
to work experience.
True returns to work experience
Yes No
Average wage in ¯rst job (in euros)
Economics 1330.6 1564.1
Business 1318.3 1555.8
Dutch law 1268.1 1564.7
Psychology 1269.4 1515.0
Fraction changing jobs within year after accepting ¯rst job
Economics 0.36 0.01
Business 0.37 0.01
Dutch law 0.41 0.00
Psychology 0.50 0.02
Average wage increase between ¯rst and second job (in euros)
Economics 207.1 74.4
Business 206.8 73.3
Dutch law 162.5 16.3
Psychology 170.8 77.1
graduation are higher. Returns to work experience have a direct impact on the
labor market position after accepting the ¯rst job and because individuals have
been less selective on choosing their ¯rst job, the transition rate out of the ¯rst
job is higher as well as the expected wage increase between the ¯rst and second
job. Finally, ¹ w is higher if there are returns to work experience and thus the
expected long-run wage EFe[WjW > ¹ w] will be higher.
We simulate our model twice, ¯rst using the estimated parameters and second
without returns to work experience Ã¸ = Ã¹ = 1. In the latter case all job-to-job
transitions and wage increases are the consequence of labor market frictions. In
Figures 9 and 10 we show the expected employment rates and the average earn-
ings for the two years following graduation.14 The di®erence between both lines
in each ¯gure is the result of true returns to early work experience. There are
very substantial di®erences in employment rates with and without true returns to
work experience and this di®erence already exists at the moment of graduation.
The existence of true returns to work experience causes individuals to ¯nd their
¯rst job much faster. The ¯rst job is a stepping stone to better jobs and therefore
have low reservation wages for the ¯rst job. There is also a substantial di®erence
in average earnings with and without true returns to work experience. The dif-
ference in earnings in the period just after graduation should be attributed to
di®erences in employment rates, as the average wage in the ¯rst job is much lower
14In case an individual is unemployed his monthly earnings equal the welfare bene¯ts of 450
euros per month.
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47in case there are true returns to work experience (see Table 10). Furthermore,
from Table 10 we see if there would be no returns to work experience the fraction
of individuals that moves to a new job within a year after accepting the ¯rst
job is reduced enormously. This reduction in job turnover is the consequence of
reduced search e®ort while being employed due to high costs of on-the-job search.
Also the wage increase associated to the move from the ¯rst to the second job
is much lower if there are no returns to work experience. But this is partly the
result of the higher average wages in the ¯rst job.
Our simulation experiments indicate that true returns to early work experi-
ence have a large impact on labor market outcomes. But in case there are no true
returns to work experience, labor market frictions cause that earnings increase
over time and individuals switch jobs and experience wage growth. The impact of
labor market frictions on average labor market outcomes of a group becomes less
if the duration since graduation increases, as individuals reach the steady state of
the labor market. Therefore, particularly in the beginning of the life cycle changes
in average earnings increases should not all be attributed to accumulated work
experience.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we developed a model that describes the labor market behavior of in-
dividuals around graduation. We explicitly modelled job search e®ort and allowed
for on-the-job search. Students usually do not start working before graduating,
but start searching for work prior to graduation. Therefore, our model is non
stationary. In particular, some period before graduation students start search-
ing for work with a low intensity and high reservation wages. As the moment
of graduation approaches (and they have not found a job yet), students increase
their job search e®ort and lower their reservation wage. This model explains the
common ¯nding that a large share of students starts working immediately after
graduating.
Reduced-form analyses show that predictions from our theoretical model are
in agreement with our data. In the structural empirical analyses we have used
di®erent groups of university graduates in the Netherlands. The data describe a
relatively long observation period, which allows to investigate the importance of
business cycle variation on labor market prospects. The empirical results indicate
that the business cycle is important, in particular the unemployment rate around
graduation a®ects the wage o®er distribution. If the unemployment rate decreases
with 1 percentage point, wage o®ers increase on average with 3 percent.
48Our model shows that employment rates at graduation could be substantially
higher if students would search earlier for work. Currently most students postpone
searching for work until only shortly before graduation. Employment rates at
graduation could be increased from around 40 percent to 65 percent if all students
would start searching for work actively 6 months prior to graduation.
Our results indicate that there are substantial returns to work experience
in the beginning of a career. The existence of these returns to work experience
have particularly large e®ects on employment rates just after graduation. This
indicates that the ¯rst job is often a stepping stone towards better jobs which
become only available if an individual has some work experience.
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51Appendix A: Proofs of the propositions
Proposition 1 Á¿ ¸ Á¿¡k for all ¿ = 1;::: and k = 1;:::;¿. Before graduation
the reservation wage of a student Á¿ is non increasing as the moment of graduation
approaches.
Proof of Proposition 1: Rewrite equation (2) as




+¸u(s¿)EFu;¿ [maxfRe(W) ¡ Re(Á¿);0g]
ª
Because cu(0) = 0 and ¸u(0) = 0, the right-hand side of the equation should be
non-negative, which means Re(Á¿+1) ¸ Re(Á¿). Re(¢) is an increasing function in its
argument, which implies Á¿+1 ¸ Á¿. ¤
Proposition 2 If s¿ > 0, then s¿ < s¿¡k for all ¿ = 1;::: and k = 1;:::;¿. Students,
who have not accepted a job yet, increase their job search e®ort as the moment of
graduation gets closer.
Proof of Proposition 2: Recall that Á¿ ¸ Á¿¡1. As mentioned above
R 1
Á [Re(x) ¡ Re(Á)]dF(x)
is decreasing in Á, which means
Z 1
Á¿




Furthermore, because Fu;¿¡1(¢) ¯rst-order stochastically dominates Fu;¿(¢),
Z 1
Á¿¡1
















u(s) is an increasing function in s, the inequality implies s¿ < s¿¡1. ¤
Proposition 3 ¿0 is non decreasing if C0 decreases, i.e. lower ¯xed costs of starting
job search do not cause a student to start searching for work actively shorter before the
moment of graduation.
52Proof of Proposition 3: Consider the case where the ¯xed costs of starting job search
change from C0 to C0
0 < C0. Changing the ¯xed costs does not a®ect Re(Á¿). Therefore,
we can rewrite
Re(Á¿) ¡ C0
0(1 + ½)¿¡1 = Re(Á¿) ¡ C0(1 + ½)¿¡1 ¡ (C0
0 ¡ C0)(1 + ½)¿¡1
Since for any moment ¿ < ¿0
Re(Á¿0) ¡ C0(1 + ½)¿0¡1 > Re(Á¿) ¡ C0(1 + ½)¿¡1
we can show that
Re(Á¿0) ¡ C0
0(1 + ½)¿0¡1 = Re(Á¿0) ¡ C0(1 + ½)¿0¡1 ¡ (C0
0 ¡ C0)(1 + ½)¿0¡1
> Re(Á¿) ¡ C0(1 + ½)¿¡1 ¡ (C0
0 ¡ C0)(1 + ½)¿0¡1
> Re(Á¿) ¡ C0(1 + ½)¿¡1 ¡ (C0
0 ¡ C0)(1 + ½)¿¡1










Proposition 4 The moment ¿0 at which a student starts searching for work is unique
or non-existing.
Proof of Proposition 4: Note that
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where in the last line s¿ is the optimal amount of job search e®ort in period ¿. The
right-hand side is strictly positive. The ¯rst term (1+ ½)¿¡1 is increasing in ¿, but the
second term is decreasing in ¿, as we know that the term increases in s¿ and s¿+1 < s¿.
Next note that
C0(1 + ½)¿ ¡ C0(1 + ½)¿¡1 = ½C0(1 + ½)¿¡1






¡ c(s¿) > ½C0
53Re(Á¿)¡C0(1+½)¿¡1 increases in ¿, otherwise it is decreasing. Since the left-hand side
decreases in ¿ and the right-hand side does not depend on ¿, there exists a unique ¿0.
However, if at the optimal moment of starting job search the returns to job search
are lower than the present value of the ¯xed search costs, Re(Á¿0) < C0(1+½)¿0¡1, the
student will not start searching at all before graduation. In this case ¿0 is non-existing.
¤
Proposition 5 µ¿ < µ¿¡k for all ¿ = 1;:::;¿0 and k = 1;:::;¿.
Proof of Proposition 5: Recall that s¿ is decreasing in ¿ and Á¿ is non decreas-
ing in ¿. Since ¸u(s¿) is an increasing function in s¿, it is decreasing in ¿. Fur-
thermore, because Fu;¿(¢) ¯rst-order stochastically dominates Fu;¿(¢), it holds that
Fu;¿(Á¿) · Fu;¿+1(Á¿). Since Á¿+1 ¸ Á¿, we know Fu;¿+1(Á¿) · Fu;¿+1(Á¿+1). There-
fore, (1 ¡ Fu;¿(Á¿)) ¸ (1 ¡ Fu;¿+1(Á¿+1)). As a result µ¿ is decreasing in ¿. ¤
Proposition 6 There exists a wage level ¹ w, for which s = 0 if w ¸ ¹ w. For w < ¹ w, s
is positive and decreasing in w. A worker reduces his job search e®ort if he receives a
higher wage. If the wage exceeds a certain level, the worker does not devote any e®ort
to job search.
Proof of Proposition 6: Consider the condition for devoting a positive amount of









The left-hand side of the equation is positive. The right-hand side is also positive.
To show that there exists some ¹ w above which individuals stop devoting e®ort to job
search, we have to show that the right-hand side is decreasing in w and becomes 0 if





which is negative, because Re(w) is an increasing function in w. Next we show that if
w approaches in¯nity the right-hand side of the condition for positive job search e®ort
becomes 0. Note that Re(x) ¡ Re(w) · x ¡ w for x ¸ w. This means
Z 1
w
[Re(x) ¡ Re(w)]dFe(x) ·
Z 1
w















[Re(x) ¡ Re(w)]dFe(x) = 0




e(s) is an increasing function in s. Since
R 1
w Re(x)¡
Re(w)dFe(x) decreases in w, search e®ort decreases in w for w < ¹ w. ¤
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